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ESSAY
THE HANDICAPPING EFFECT OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN
REPRODUCTIVE TORT CASES: CORRECTING THE LEGAL
PERCEPTION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
KERRY T. COOPERMAN*
“Changes are necessary; but what they ought to be, what they
will be, and how and when to be produced, are arduous
questions.”—John Jay (1786)1
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, progressive legislation and aggressive
advocacy have generated policies under which people with disabilities
could participate more meaningfully in America’s social, political, and
professional spheres. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the
“ADA”)2 codified the most comprehensive safeguards of civil rights since
the 1960s and carried the hope that it would enable people with disabilities
to engage equally in their communities.3 A major player in the passage of
the ADA,4 the disability community continued to develop political
footholds, spearhead local and national social movements, and insist on
new statutory protections. But this initial momentum did not yield the

Copyright © 2008 by Kerry T. Cooperman.
* Kerry Cooperman is a third-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law
where he is a Notes and Comments Editor for the Maryland Law Review. The author wishes to
thank a number of people whose ideas and energy enriched this piece. The author is endlessly
grateful to Professor Mark Rothstein for introducing him to the challenges of disability law and
for patiently guiding his writing process. Professors Diane Hoffman and Wendy Hensel merit
equal praise for their inspiring and ongoing contributions to the field of health care ethics.
Heather Pruger’s talent and intellectual support were also invaluable to him. Finally, the author
owes special thanks to Veronica Berruz, whose civic impulse and rare sensibility have pushed him
to care more deeply about communities that are just out of sight.
1. WILLIAM JAY, II THE LIFE OF JOHN JAY 191 (1833).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
3. See Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217,
255 (2004) (stating that the ADA is “rich with proclamations of a national commitment to
welcome persons with disabilities into all aspects of society”).
4. See Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability
Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 352 (2000) (noting that the disability rights
movement “can claim primary political responsibility for the ADA”).
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substantive changes that many had anticipated.5 Nearly a decade after the
ADA’s enactment, employees with disabilities lost over 95% of ADA
cases;6 the Supreme Court of the United States restricted the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s power to construe the ADA’s
protections;7 and prenatal genetic testing continued to spawn reproductive
tort claims that negatively stereotyped persons with disabilities.8
Reproductive technology has become a double-edged sword for the
disability community. Although genetic innovation promises new medical
therapies,9 it also breeds new litigation that etches false conceptions of
disability, harm, and autonomy into the common law and the national
consciousness. Alas, courts and legislatures often disregard the social
messages that their laws fortify, and “surprisingly little legal scholarship”
explains how reproductive tort claims affect people with disabilities.10
This Essay argues that courts should contextualize their views of
disability, health, and legal harm by recognizing families’ diverse
circumstances and constrained choices, instead of propagating stigmatizing
stereotypes about people with disabilities through an outmoded
reproductive tort jurisprudence. First, this Essay shows why the conceptual
framework through which courts decide reproductive tort claims conveys
harmful messages about the value of persons with disabilities.11 Second, it
argues that judicial reasoning should embody more contextual, nondichotomous solutions that protect the diversity of the sensitive interests at
stake.12 Third, it posits that a contextual jurisprudence will become
increasingly vital as social, scientific, and legal forces continue to constrain
parental reproductive choices.13 Last, this Essay concludes that courts must
consider the profound influence their jurisprudence has on societal views of

5. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 923 (2003) (observing that the success rate for plaintiffs in ADA cases
“is second in futility only to that of prisoner plaintiffs”).
6. John W. Parry, 1999 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 24
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 348, 348 (2000).
7. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (ruling that “no agency,”
including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “has been delegated authority to
interpret the term ‘disability’”).
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See, e.g., Edward J. Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability Rights,
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 913 (2002) (noting that the completion of the Human Genome Project and
other related projects led researchers to isolate the genes that contribute to Alzheimer’s disease,
breast cancer, cystic fibrosis, Gaucher Disease, fragile X Syndrome, and Huntington’s disease).
10. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 144 (2005).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
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the disability community and must adopt a contextual approach to combat
prevalent social stereotypes.14
II. JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN REPRODUCTIVE TORT CASES CONVEY HARMFUL
STEREOTYPES ABOUT PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES BY REINFORCING
THE MEDICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY, EMBRACING OUTMODED
NOTIONS OF LEGAL HARM, AND USING STIGMATIZING RHETORIC
The disability rights movement seeks to propagate a more truthful
perception of what it means to live with a disability.15 But because notions
of “disability” and “harm” are complex, controversial, and fluid,
legislatures and courts rarely achieve consensus on definitions when
drafting statutes and deciding cases, respectively.16 Nor do these entities
adequately evaluate the social forces and political ideologies that influence
their decision-making.17 Thus, legislative and judicial decisions frequently
result in false dichotomies between healthy children and children with
disabilities that perpetuate harmful and stigmatizing stereotypes.18
A. Complex and Varied Models of “Disability” and “Harm” Give
Context to Reproductive Tort Claims, While Highlighting
Underlying Moral Tensions
Disability policy scholars have developed three principal models of
disability that give context to reproductive tort disputes. First, the “medical
model” treats disability as a natural defect that causes incapacity, yields
social isolation and economic dependence, and requires medical
intervention.19 Under this model, society need not alleviate the social
disadvantages that arise from disability because nature, not society, causes
disability.20 Thus, social policy based on the medical model encourages
people with disabilities to “approximate dominant physical standards as

14. See infra Part V.
15. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 352.
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the Three
Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1189–91 & 1189 n.45 (2002)
(noting that “the failure to develop a coherent and consistent theory of disability” has resulted in
“inconsistent” judicial results); see also infra Part II.A. (examining various models of and
approaches to “disability” and “harm”).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 146 (stating that under the medical model of disability,
disability “results from the internal functional limitations of an individual”).
20. Id. As a result, “any remediation society chooses to undertake [is] . . . charitable
intervention . . . .” Id. at 147.
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closely as possible” by using medical therapies to eradicate disability.21 In
contrast, the “socio-political model” (the “social model”) deems disability
to be a social construct arising from “environmental factors” such as
culture, institutions, and private conduct.22 Unlike the medical model, the
social model imposes certain duties on society because communities
transform people with functional impairments into people with disabilities
(e.g., a man who cannot walk cannot live in an apartment that lacks an
elevator because society did not fully contemplate the non-ambulatory).23
Finally, the “minority group model” posits that disability is not only a social
construct, but also one that creates a “discrete minority group” and “unified
political body.”24 This model empowers people with disabilities to insist
on the “eradication of exclusionary social practices . . . as a matter of civil
rights.”25
Like the meaning of “disability,” the meaning of “harm” becomes
more elusive in the tort context as medical science creates new occasions
for negligence in prenatal genetic testing.26 Under a lay definition of
harm—in which harm equals physical ailment—injury and harm are
effectively identical.27 But in the reproductive tort setting, where families
suffer a variety of physical and non-physical injuries, harm is more
accurately “the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest.”28
Further, the personal experience of harm can “both overlap and be quite
distinct from legal conceptions of harm.”29

21. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mary Crossley, The Disability
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627 (1999) (“[A] disability studies lens may bring
into focus how some legal decisionmakers continue to act on the assumption that biology is
destiny when it comes to disability.”); Hensel, supra note 10, at 146–47 (noting that the medical
model “dominate[s] public thinking” and underlies global notions of disability).
22. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000).
23. Id. at 215–16.
24. Hensel, supra note 10, at 149.
25. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But see Crossley, supra note 21, at
664 (noting that the social and minority-group models may not adequately account for the
differences in the physical impairments and life-experiences among people with greatly varying
disabilities).
26. See, e.g., NICOLETTE PRIAULX, THE HARM PARADOX: TORT LAW AND THE UNWANTED
CHILD IN AN ERA OF CHOICE 4 (2007) (“The concept of ‘harm’, though seemingly self-evident, is
thoroughly ambiguous.”); see also Hensel, supra note 10, at 150 (suggesting that while genetic
technology and scholarship have progressed, the common law of torts “has clearly lagged
behind”); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV.
115, 134 (1993) (“[V]arious tort rules reflect the coolness of the developing tort law to psychiatry
and psychology.”).
27. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 4.
28. JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 33
(1984).
29. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 4.
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In her recent book on this subject, Professor Nicolette Priaulx states
that “some kinds of harms are easily assimilated within the traditional
corpus of law, [whereas] others do not lend themselves so easily to tortious
characterisation [sic].”30 So to determine how wrongful birth and wrongful
life claims affect people with disabilities, one must ask what and whose
interests tort law serves.31 These questions raise others: Should courts
apply a subjective or objective test to determine legal harm? Is the birth of
a healthy, unwanted newborn a legal harm? Is the birth of a newborn with
an expected disability a legal harm? Is a violation of parental autonomy
with respect to the existence of a newborn a legal harm? Are a parent’s
financial burden and emotional trauma legal harms? Can healthy newborns
cause more harm to parents than newborns with disabilities in certain
circumstances? If so, are these harms different by type or degree?
The United Kingdom offers a useful body of case law that reveals the
social backdrop of unsettled judicial perceptions of reproductive harm.
British courts first evaluated reproductive harm in Udale v. Bloomsbury
Area Health Authority,32 where a woman conceived after undergoing a
failed sterilization procedure.33 Although the parents were entitled to
certain prenatal damages,34 the Udale court ruled, they could not claim that
their child’s birth was a legal harm because childbirth is “a blessing and an
Therefore, the costs of childbirth and
occasion for rejoicing.”35
childrearing were not compensable.36
Two years later, the Thake v. Maurice37 court refused to follow
Udale,38 reasoning that “the birth of a healthy baby is not always a
blessing” because (1) family planning is prevalent; (2) abortions and
vasectomies are lawful and common; and (3) childrearing is costly.39 That
same year, the Court of Appeal of England relied on Thake’s principles in
Emeh v. Kensington40 to award childrearing costs to a single woman who

30. Id. at 4–5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 5.
32. (1983) 2 All E.R. 522 (Q.B.D.).
33. Id. at 523.
34. Id. at 527. These prenatal damages were for the costs of (1) the original sterilization and
re-sterilization; (2) the shock, anxiety, and fear of pregnancy; (3) the thwarting of the couple’s
decision not to have more children; (4) the medical fees of pregnancy; and (5) the couple’s loss of
earnings for eleven months. Id.
35. Id. at 531.
36. Id. at 523–24, 531.
37. (1986) Q.B. 644 (Exeter).
38. Id. at 665–67.
39. Id. Notably, the court stated that “every baby has a belly to be filled and a body to be
clothed” and that a healthy newborn is a blessing only when “born to the happy family life which
we would all like a baby to have.” Id. at 666.
40. (1985) 1 Q.B. 1012 (A.C.).
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birthed a child with a severe congenital defect after a failed sterilization.41
But fifteen years later, England’s House of Lords returned to Udale’s
reasoning in McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board,42 deciding that a couple
that had a “healthy” child after a failed vasectomy could not recover
childrearing costs.43 Deeming it “unrealistic” and “distasteful” to “place a
monetary value on the birth of a normal and healthy child,” the McFarlane
court declared that (1) “the birth of a normal, healthy baby [is] a blessing,
not [a] detriment”; and (2) this blessing outweighs the costs of parenting.44
These vacillating judicial decisions and diverse models of harm and
disability highlight the moral tensions underlying reproductive tort cases.
Even if a healthy child is a blessing, “invasive [contraceptive] medical
procedures” signal that, to some couples, childbirth does not yield the “joy”
that McFarlane describes.45 Professor Emily Jackson emphasizes this,
noting that one’s “invasive surgery” to achieve infertility shows that
childbirth is not always a blessing.46 By ruling that healthy children are not
legal harms, however, English courts suggest that ones with disabilities may
be legal harms—a dichotomy with pervasive effects.
B. The Uncertain Propriety of Reproductive Tort Claims Has Forced
Judges to Publicly Confront Difficult Existential Questions
Involving the Cost and Value of Life with a Disability,
Nonexistence, Parenthood, and Legal Compensation
Four main tort claims pressure judges to publicly assess the value and
compensability of infants with disabilities: wrongful pregnancy, false
representation, wrongful birth, and wrongful life.47 Wrongful pregnancy
was the earliest reproductive tort claim in the United States, arising when
unwanted pregnancy resulted from a failed abortion or sterilization, or from
a manufacturer’s faulty contraceptive.48 As of 2005, thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia recognized this claim.49 But like the McFarlane
and Udale courts, most state courts prohibit childrearing damages and
41. Id. at 1015, 1021–22.
42. (2000) 2 A.C. 59 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.).
43. Id. at 83.
44. Id. at 111, 113–14.
45. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 4–6 (noting that the McFarlane court “erroneous[ly] and
conveniently overlook[ed] the fact that . . . a ‘blessing’ has been forced upon” the couple).
46. Emily Jackson, Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle, 65 MOD. L.
REV. 176, 199 (2002).
47. Hensel, supra note 10, at 151, 153.
48. See, e.g., Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. 1991) (“An action for
‘wrongful conception or pregnancy’ refers to a claim for damages sustained by the parents of an
unexpected child alleging that the conception of the child resulted from negligent sterilization
procedures or a defective contraceptive product.”).
49. Hensel, supra note 10, at 153.
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award medical and emotional distress damages only for costs relating to
pregnancy and delivery.50 The few courts that allow childrearing damages
acknowledge the attendant public policy concerns, including newborns’
“silent interests,” “parent-child relationships,”51 and the psychological harm
to the child who is “branded” an “‘emotional bastard.’”52 Traditionally and
still, “most jurisdictions” let plaintiffs seek damages for wrongful
pregnancy53 because, as the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained, to
prohibit damages for this tort “would defy logic and be contrary to the
concept of causation in tort.”54
Parents also sue for false representation when pregnancy occurs after
one wrongfully assures the other of infertility.55 In Moorman v. Walker,56
for instance, a woman falsely told her boyfriend she was infertile after he
“made it very clear” he did not want children out of wedlock.57 Rejecting
the boyfriend’s suit for false representation after the woman conceived, the
court expressed its practical and moral concerns: (1) a court cannot decide
whether “the monetary cost of [a] life is worth more than its value”; (2) this
claim facilitates the “unseemly spectacle” of parents disparaging their
children; (3) public policy forbids parents from maximizing their awards by
claiming “in open court” that their child’s existence is harmful; and (4) this
claim “trivializes life itself.”58 Similarly, in C.A.M. v. R.A.W.,59 a New
Jersey appellate court affirmed that parents of a “normal, healthy child”
may not recover compensatory or punitive damages for false
representation.60 Like McFarlane’s reasoning, C.A.M.’s emphasis on a
normal, healthy child suggests that one with a disability may be
compensable.61 In fact, in Szekeres v. Robinson,62 the Supreme Court of

50. See Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth
in the United States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 589 (1995) (stating
that “of the thirty-six jurisdictions that allow wrongful pregnancy claims, twenty-eight deny
damages for child-rearing as a matter of law”).
51. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. 1977).
52. See Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to
the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401,
1449 (quoting Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 173).
53. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984).
54. Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Ky. 1981).
55. See, e.g., C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(involving a father who falsely claimed he had undergone a vasectomy).
56. 773 P.2d 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
57. Id. at 888.
58. Id. at 889 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
59. 568 A.2d 556.
60. Id. at 563.
61. Compare id. with McFarlane v. Tayside Health Bd., (2000) 2 A.C. 59, 113–14 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Scot.) (declaring that parents of a “healthy” child may not recover childrearing
costs because the “blessing” of a healthy child’s birth outweighs the costs of “parenthood”).
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Nevada announced that although a “normal birth is not a wrong, it is a
‘right,’”63 this conclusion applies only to healthy births and not necessarily
to cases in which “medical negligence results in . . . genetic deformities and
the like.”64
Courts are generally inconsistent in their treatment of wrongful birth
and wrongful life claims. While many courts disregard the benefits of
rearing children with genetic defects, other courts recognize them.65 In
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,66 a physician incorrectly assured a pregnant woman
with rubella that the virus would not affect her developing fetus, and the
child was born with “substantial defects” in sight, hearing, and speech.67
Arguing that they would have considered an abortion, the parents sued for
wrongful birth, on behalf of themselves, and wrongful life, on behalf of
their child.68 The Gleitman court rejected the wrongful birth claim,
reasoning that judges cannot accurately weigh existential harm against the
“complex human benefits” of parenthood and adding that “[a] child need
not be perfect to have a worthwhile life.”69 The court also rejected the
wrongful life claim, explaining that it could not weigh the child’s life with
defects against “the utter void of nonexistence.”70
Ten years later, in Becker v. Schwartz,71 a thirty-five-year-old woman
who birthed a child with Down’s syndrome sued for wrongful birth and
wrongful life, alleging that her physician neither warned her of age-related
pregnancy risks nor recommended an amniocentesis.72 Like the Gleitman
court, the Becker court rejected the wrongful life claim, declaring that only
“the philosophers and the theologians” should decide whether nonexistence
is better than life with “gross deficiencies.”73 But contrary to Gleitman, the

62. 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986).
63. Id. at 1078 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1078 n.3.
65. Hensel, supra note 10, at 154 (stating that courts’ rationales in cases involving healthy
children “stand in contrast” to the rationales courts invoke “in the context of a child born with a
genetic defect”).
66. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
67. Id. at 690. The plaintiff’s expert testified that “women who have [rubella] in the first
trimester of their pregnancy will produce infants with birth defects in 20 to 50 per cent of the
cases.” Id.
68. Id. at 691. In a typical wrongful birth claim, parents sue for injuries allegedly resulting
from the birth, whereas in a typical wrongful life claim, parents sue on behalf of the child with a
disability, alleging that he or she would be better off not having been born at all. Willis v. Wu,
607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004).
69. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693. The court stated that “[t]he sanctity of the single human life is
the decisive factor in this suit . . . . We are not talking here about the breeding of prize cattle.” Id.
70. Id. at 692.
71. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
72. Id. at 808–09.
73. Id. at 812.
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Becker court recognized the wrongful birth claim because the costs of
childcare and treatment were calculable.74 The Becker court refused to
permit recovery for psychological harm, deeming this calculation “too
speculative” and noting that “parents may yet experience a love that even an
abnormality cannot fully dampen.”75
In line with Becker, most states have recognized wrongful birth claims
but not wrongful life claims.76 In a precursor to wrongful life cases,
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,77 Justice Holmes ruled that claims
on behalf of children relating to prenatal injury were invalid because the
unborn child was “part of the mother at the time of the injury, [and] any
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was
recoverable by her . . . .”78 Later, in Walker v. Mart,79 a woman whose
child had severe congenital defects sued her osteopathic physician for
wrongful life for negligently performing prenatal tests to detect rubella.80
Reasoning that children “have neither the ability nor the right” to decide
existential questions, the Walker court rejected the wrongful life claim,
adding that although an “overwhelming majority of jurisdictions” allow
wrongful birth claims, only three allow wrongful life claims.81
Indeed, some states cite public policy and judicial unmanageability as
prohibiting both wrongful birth and wrongful life claims. In Schork v.
Huber,82 for example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that “[t]he
establishment of a cause of action based on the matter of wrongful
conception, wrongful life or wrongful birth is clearly within the purview of
the legislature only.”83 Likewise, some state legislatures prohibit all claims
74. Id. at 813.
75. Id. at 814.
76. See Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208–09 n.9 (Colo. 1988) (noting the
“overwhelming majority” of jurisdictions that recognize wrongful birth claims and citing various
state cases and statutes in which courts have rejected wrongful life claims); see, e.g., Smith v.
Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 355 (N.H. 1986) (recognizing wrongful birth claims but refusing to recognize
wrongful life claims); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985) (same); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982) (recognizing wrongful birth claims); see also Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (rejecting a wrongful life claim, reasoning that
to determine “[w]hether it is better to have never been born at all rather than to have been born
with serious mental defects . . . would lead us into the field of metaphysics, beyond the realm of
our understanding or ability to solve”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 A.2d 110, 112 (Pa. 1981).
77. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). But see Angelini v. OMD Corp., 575 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. 1991)
(noting that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts abrogated Dietrich’s rule in Keyes v.
Construction Service, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960), which established that the administrator of a
deceased child’s estate “could recover for wrongful death” in certain cases).
78. Id. at 17.
79. 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990).
80. Id. at 736.
81. Id. at 737 n.3, 738, 740.
82. 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
83. Id. at 863.
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asserting that “but for the negligent conduct of another,” the person “would
have been aborted.”84
In limited forms, however, several states still recognize wrongful life
claims.85 In Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,86 a child born with
Tay-Sachs disease sued a laboratory for wrongful life, alleging that it
negligently failed to determine that both parents carried the mutation known
to cause the disorder.87 The intermediate appellate court recognized the
claim, reasoning that (1) “eugenic abortion” controls the “increasingly large
part of the overall national health care burden” that genetic defects cause;
(2) tort law helps “to avoid genetic disaster”; and (3) newborns with
disabilities suffer compensable harm.88 Besides, the court added, tort law
reflects the “basic changes in the way society views such matters.”89 In
dicta, the court noted that its reasoning may support the claim of an
“impaired infant” against her parents who, knowing of a prenatal defect,
caused harm by allowing the child to be born.90 Two years later, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the general validity of wrongful life
claims, allowing courts to award non-general damages to compensate a
“severely handicapped or suffering child” for medical care.91 New Jersey
and Washington similarly allow wrongful life claims.92
One scholar, Professor Hensel, notes that the “novelty” of reproductive
torts has recently “worn off” due to expanded abortion rights and better
prenatal genetic testing.93 Most states still allow wrongful birth claims to
compensate for medical costs, deter medical negligence, and protect

84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (2008); see also
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-344 (2008) (prohibiting claims that “but for the act or omission of another,
a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted”).
85. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982) (in banc).
86. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), overruled in part by Turpin, 643 P.2d at 965
(affirming that a child with a disability may bring a wrongful life claim in California, but
overruling the Curlender court’s decision to allow that child to recover “general damages”).
87. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480–81.
88. Id. at 487–88 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Several courts have
invoked the third reason. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ill.
1977) (noting the view that “the embryo, from the moment of conception, is a separate organism
that can be compensated for negligently inflicted prenatal harm”); Watt v. Rama (1972) V.R. 353,
377 (Austl.) (stating, in dicta, that “[d]isease and trauma happening at any time from the womb to
the tomb apparently can affect one’s well-being and future health”).
89. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
90. Id. at 488. The California legislature immediately passed a law to protect parents against
such liability. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (WEST 2007).
91. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961–62, 966.
92. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983).
93. Hensel, supra note 10, at 160.
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parental autonomy.94 The opposing minority of states rejects these claims,
often on grounds of institutional incompetence.95 The Supreme Court of
Georgia, for instance, explained that because the “problems presented by
the concept of ‘wrongful birth’ actions can only become increasingly more
numerous and more complex,” only the legislature should tackle them.96
For the same reasons, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that
“neither claims for wrongful birth nor claims for wrongful life are
cognizable at law in this jurisdiction.”97 Besides, Professor Hensel argues,
“wrongful birth and wrongful life actions result in equally anti-therapeutic
consequences for people with disabilities.”98
The jurisdictional splits, diverse legal concerns, and conflicting
preferences that characterize American reproductive tort jurisprudence
reveal the challenges that judges face when making legal decisions that are
also declarations of moral policy.
C. Courts Perpetuate Stigmatizing Stereotypes by Sustaining False
Dichotomies Between Healthy Children and Children with
Disabilities
The underlying message of the judiciary and legislature reveals that
society’s “physiological model of ‘normality’” still excludes people with
disabilities, and that this model governs public discourse.99 Despite the
progressive ideas giving rise to the ADA, the disability rights movement,
and the minority-group model of disability, the blessing-burden distinction
persists. Lord Steyn, in McFarlane, ruled that the United Kingdom’s “tort
law does not permit parents of a healthy . . . child” to recover childrearing
costs from a negligent physician.100 The C.A.M. court ruled that the parents
of a normal, healthy baby were not entitled to compensatory or punitive
damages.101 The Szekeres court “t[ook] the trouble” to declare that
although a “normal birth is not a wrong,” the birth of a baby with “genetic
deformities and the like” may be legally compensable.102 The Curlender
court suggested that “defectively born” children are compensable “genetic

94. Id. at 160–61.
95. See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983) (refusing to recognize a
wrongful birth claim, explaining that only the legislature can establish this cause of action).
96. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 563 (Ga. 1990).
97. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985).
98. Hensel, supra note 10, at 170.
99. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 54.
100. McFarlane v. Tayside Health Bd., (2000) 2 A.C. 59, 83 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.)
(emphasis added).
101. C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
102. Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1078 & n.3 (Nev. 1986).
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disaster[s]” that burden the health care system.103 As Professor Priaulx
highlights, “disability seems to be all about real bodies that are physically,
sensorily or intellectually different in undesirable ways.”104
In light of these judicial proclamations, the financial benefits of
reproductive tort claims105 “come at great expense” to people living with
disabilities for three reasons.106 Principally, the rhetoric of litigation tends
to ignore “attitudinal discrimination” and to characterize members of
society as the “protectors, guides and spokespersons for disabled
citizens.”107 First, a judicial opinion in a wrongful birth or wrongful life
case is often a “community pronouncement, via a government institution,”
that an impaired life is worse than nonexistence.108 This “state-sanctioned
message” is an important policy declaration109 and a “key societal signifier”
because public perceptions of harm are “closely linked” to the law.110
Thus, when McFarlane and Curlender announced that a healthy newborn is
a blessing and an unhealthy one is a harm, they sanctioned society to do the
same.111 Insurance companies, health providers, and private enterprises,
for example, could rely on these judicial messages to justify denying
support to parents who refuse to abort fetuses with known genetic
defects.112 Second, de facto, reproductive tort claims compel parents either
to deny themselves needed compensation or to “disavow [their children’s]
very existence in open court.”113 This non-choice raises broader policy
questions:
103. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 487–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
104. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 54 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 327, 336 (2004) (noting financial support and deterrence of misconduct among these
benefits).
106. Hensel, supra note 10, at 171.
107. See Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and
Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 106–07 (1994) (noting that courts have
generally ignored harmful societal attitudes).
108. Hensel, supra note 10, at 173.
109. Id.
110. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 38 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
111. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 174 (positing that “[j]udicial recognition” of wrongful birth
and wrongful life claims “is akin to a state-sanctioned acknowledgement that [society] . . . may
legitimately evaluate whether an individual with impairments has a rightful place in the
community”).
112. Id. at 180–81. Professor Hensel notes that, unlike non-reproductive tort rulings that favor
plaintiffs, which all “in some respect endorse the value of the plaintiff’s life,” wrongful birth and
wrongful life rulings “negate[]” the value of the plaintiff’s life. Id. at 175–76.
113. Id. at 172. “The anti-therapeutic consequences” of this parental announcement in open
court are “amplified, since the disparagement is voiced from within the community of people with
disabilities and cannot be discounted by others as mere ignorance or prejudice.” Id. at 173.
Indeed, malpractice litigation is often “highly public.” Edward A. Dauer, A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Perspective on Legal Responses to Medical Error, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 37, 38
(2003).
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Why should playmates’ parents, the neighbors, or the schools
change to incorporate existing children with disabilities if
families and . . . government . . . work as hard as they do to avoid
the births of people who will have these conditions? Where do
we first learn justice, sharing, and cooperation, but in the
family?114
Third, because parents must now decide both how many children they
want and what kind of children they do not want, stereotypes that courts
inadvertently reinforce affect whether people with disabilities are “born at
all.”115
Finally, judicial opinions may acutely affect adults living with
disabilities and families raising children with disabilities. To many adults
with disabilities, even non-tortious prenatal testing signals that “the world
would be better off without [them] alive” and makes them “feel devalued as
human beings.”116 Indeed, prenatal testing implies that society would
rather “solve” disabilities than make society amenable to them.117 In
certain cultures, in fact, public positions regarding disability directly affect
societal and familial well-being. For example, a British government
program seeking to identify the carriers of Maple Syrup Urine Disease in a
Bedouin tribe caused nearly every male to seek a wife outside the tribe,
resulting in a population of unmarried Bedouin women.118 One disability
scholar declared that “[w]e in the disability rights community resist the
notion that our humanness can be evaluated and then reduced to a flawed
gene.”119 Thus, according to Professor Hensel, the legal recognition of
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims is “akin to a public endorsement of
eugenic abortion in lieu of . . . life with disabilities.”120
Insensitive jurisprudence may also yield moral, emotional, and
financial hardships for parents contemplating abortion. In Curlender’s
jurisdiction, for example, parents who choose to have a child despite a
genetic defect know they have legally harmed their child.121 Indeed, the
114. Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My Mind about Prenatal Diagnosis, in
PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 234, 251 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds.,
2000).
115. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) (in banc).
116. Marsha Saxton, Why Members of the Disability Community Oppose Prenatal Diagnosis
and Selective Abortion, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 114, at 160.
117. Asch, supra note 114, at 240.
118. Mairi Levitt, A Sociological Perspective on Genetic Screening, in THE ETHICS OF
GENETIC SCREENING 157, 160 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 1999).
119. Saxton, supra note 116, at 161.
120. Hensel, supra note 10, at 177.
121. See Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (identifying
“no sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answerable for the pain,
suffering and misery” they visit on their newborns); see also Adrienne Asch, Reproductive
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Curlender court “did not merely hint” that these parents should be
answerable,122 morally and at law, “for the pain, suffering, and misery
which they have wrought upon their offspring.”123 At least one scholar
agrees with Curlender that “[i]n some cases it might be possible to say that
the parents have made a ‘poor’ decision and have wronged the child” by
carrying her to term.124 Other cost-benefit scholars have weighed the price
of state-wide genetic screening programs against the burden of raising
children with impairments.125 Even the National Institutes of Health has
promoted “genetic counseling” to help solve the “problems” of genetic
conditions.126 Because these pronouncements deeply affect lives and
reinforce controversial policies, courts should use restraint when drafting
their judicial opinions.
III. JUDICIAL OPINIONS THAT PRESERVE TRADITIONAL TORT
MECHANISMS WHILE ACCURATELY CONCEPTUALIZING “DISABILITY”
AND “HARM” PROTECT THE LEGAL INTERESTS OF LITIGANTS AND
PROMOTE A MORE TRUTHFUL PERCEPTION OF THE DISABILITY
COMMUNITY
Some scholars argue that, due to the prohibitively high social costs of
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, “neither action should be
recognized by state legislatures or the courts.”127 But the objective
reasonably prudent person standard supporting these claims “is deeply
ingrained in common law.”128 Because states are unlikely to abolish
reproductive tort claims that deter medical negligence and compensate
families, courts should take practical steps to write judicial opinions that
reflect and promote an accurate understanding of disability.129 In so doing,
courts can compensate families and avoid perpetuating harmful false
Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69, 88 (Sherrill Cohen &
Nadine Taub eds., 1989) (stating that where genetic tests yield diagnoses of spina bifida, cystic
fibrosis, or Down’s syndrome, people generally believe that “failure to abort is cruel to the
potential child, destructive to the family, socially irresponsible, and possibly immoral”).
122. Hensel, supra note 10, at 177–78.
123. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
124. Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life
Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 241–42 (1993).
125. See, e.g., Gwen Anderson, Nondirectiveness in Prenatal Genetics: patients read between
the lines, 6 NURSING ETHICS 126, 130 (1999).
126. Genetic Disorders Causing Mental Retardation, 23 NIH GUIDE, Feb. 18, 1994, available
at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PA-94-037.html.
127. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 144–45 (identifying the impaired psychological well-being
of people with disabilities and the negative public image of disability as two social costs of
reproductive tort litigation).
128. Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW & INEQ.
429, 439 (2007).
129. See infra Part III.A.
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dichotomies,130 while yielding net benefits to all parties involved in
reproductive tort cases.131
A. Courts Should Contextualize Their Understanding of Disability and
Harm to Accommodate Families’ Diverse Experiences and to
Convey Accurate Information About Litigants
Courts adjudicating wrongful birth and wrongful life cases should
aggressively monitor the implicit messages their opinions send to litigants,
neighborhoods, and families. Indeed, mere euphemisms for wrongful birth,
which one court tried to implement, are insufficient.132 Courts should
instead avoid false bright lines between “healthy” and “disabled” by
focusing on familial context, appropriate models of harm and disability, and
the potential social effects of their rulings.
By relying on the rigid medical model of disability, some courts have
perpetuated the belief that families of children with disabilities are crippled,
whereas families of healthy children are blessed.133 Just eight years ago,
for instance, a British judge in Lee v. Taunton134 announced that “I do not
believe that it would be right for the law to deem the birth of a disabled
child to be a blessing.”135 Likewise, in Rand v. East Dorset Health
Authority,136 the same court declared that the blessings and hardships of
living with a substantially “disabled” child are “difficult to discern.”137
Despite these signals that health is the opposite of disability,138 our
experiences suggest otherwise.
Bright lines between health and disability generally obscure the
diverse experiences of families, assume that disability connotes misfortune,
and disregard the “distinct biographies [and] different social circumstances,
priorities and emotional make-ups” of litigants.139 Lord Justice Wallace of

130. See infra Part III.B.
131. See infra Part III.C.
132. See Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 290 (Del. 1989) (stating that a
claim for medical malpractice for a negligently performed prenatal chromosome study “need not
be characterized as ‘wrongful birth’ since it falls within the realm of traditional tort and medical
malpractice law”).
133. See PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 56 (noting courts’ proclamations that “caring for a
disabled child is harmful and sufficiently distinctive from the (judicially viewed harmless)
experience of caring for a non-disabled child”).
134. (2001) 1 F.L.R. 419 (Q.B.D.).
135. Nicolette Priaulx, Health, Disability & Parental Interests: Adopting a Contextual
Approach in the Reproductive Torts, 12 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 213, 219 (2005) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
136. (2000) 56 B.M.L.R. 39 (Q.B.D.).
137. Id. at 49.
138. See PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 56.
139. Priaulx, supra note 135, at 229.
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the Court of Appeal of England articulated these concerns through the
following hypothetical in his dissenting opinion in a recent wrongful birth
case.140 Compare a healthy mother who has four children but no familial
support to a mother “who is disabled” but who also has a loving and
supportive husband, siblings, parents, and friends, “all willing to help.”141
“[O]rdinary people,” Lord Justice Wallace submits, “would feel
uncomfortable about the thought that it was simply the disability which
made a difference.”142 One scholar echoes this point: “[o]ne set of parents
may give birth to a perfectly healthy baby that ends up living a miserable
life of depression and social ostracism, while another set may give birth to a
disabled child who turns out to be the next Helen Keller, a figure of success
and inspiration.”143 Besides, “the same [disabling] condition can be seen in
one country as a curse and in another as a blessing.”144 Certain Southeast
Asian cultures, for instance, believe that people with blindness “possess[] a
certain valued insight,” and the Tswana culture deems children with
disabilities “gifts from God.”145 Plainly, every parent experiences
hardships and happiness in different ratios and diverse ways according to
their unique circumstances.146
But when judicial opinions become “constant reminders” that
disabilities are actionable harms, courts risk causing “chronic sorrow” in
families147 and promulgating “pathologising assumptions” about the effects
of disability.148 To avoid an inaccurate “value-judgment . . . that the lives
of the handicapped are worth . . . less than those of a ‘normal’ person
[sic],”149 courts should examine harm and disability in a familial and
cultural context.
Particularly in reproductive tort cases, the importance of context and
the danger of bright lines are even more acute and personal than Lord
Wallace suggested. By rigidly defining disability and discounting “the

140. See Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, (2003) 3 W.L.R. 1091, 1106 (H.L.).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Sophie Zhang, The Morality of Having Children with Disabilities: A Different Perspective
on Happiness and Quality of Life, 8 MGGILL J. MED. 85, 87 (2004).
144. Id. at 85.
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See Simo Vehmas, Parental Responsibility and the Morality of Selective Abortion, 5
ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 463, 472 (2002) (“When considering the parenting of a child
with a cognitive impairment, people seem to forget the fact [that] every child is more or less a
burden to her parents.”).
147. See Margaret F. Copley & John B. Bodensteiner, Chronic Sorrow in Families of Disabled
Children, 2 J. CHILD NEUROL. 67, 69 (1987).
148. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 70 (stating that “the courts have . . . embraced a purely
medical model of disability”).
149. Jackson, supra note 50, at 607.
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context of family, community, and the individual as a whole person,” many
courts largely disregard the possibility that people with disabilities can lead
happy, meaningful lives.150 Specifically, when parents learn that their child
will have a disability, the “ultimate impact” of the defect remains largely
unknown.151 The experiences of disability, even among those with the
same condition, vary dramatically depending on familial support, financial
resources, and unknown biological factors.152 A child with cystic fibrosis,
for instance, “might die from it, survive with physical disability, or suffer
no noticeable impairment”;153 a child with Down’s syndrome may suffer
severe mental impairment or may sustain a job and meaningful
relationships;154 and a child with spina bifida may grow up crippled in a
broken home or may lead a happy life.155 An extraordinary example of the
value of context to the judicial perception of disability is Alison Davis, who
was born with Myelomeningocele Spina Bifida and explains:
Despite my disability and the gloomy predictions made by
doctors at my birth, I am now leading a very full, happy and
satisfying life by any standards. I am most definitely glad to be
alive. Yet, because handicapped people are now presumed by . . .
doctors, [courts,] philosophers and Society in general to have the
capacity only for being miserable and an economic burden on the
community most of those who would otherwise grow up to be
like me are now aborted or “allowed to die” . . . at birth.156
Elsewhere, Ms. Davis has stated that “I am an ordinary human being,
who simply has disabilities which are more obvious than those of the
majority. I believe my life . . . to be of infinite value, not valuable only if it
achieves a particular ‘quality.’”157
150. Hensel, supra note 10, at 182–83 (noting that notions of disability are “reduced to the
least common denominator of organistic functioning and focus exclusively on internally rather
than externally imposed barriers”).
151. See id. at 183. Generally, at this time, only “the identification of the defect itself and its
possible parameters” are known. Id.
152. See Zhang, supra note 143, at 86 (offering examples of people with severe disabilities
who live happy and prosperous lives).
153. Larson, supra note 9, at 922.
154. Hensel, supra note 10, at 183.
155. Zhang, supra note 143, at 86 (describing the life of Alison Davis, who earned a university
degree, married, became a well-known disability-rights activist and claims to have enjoyed a “full
and happy life” despite suffering from a severe form of spina bifida that has left her incontinent
and wheelchair bound).
156. Hensel, supra note 10, at 183–84 (quoting Alison Davis, Yes, the Baby Should Live, 31
NEW SCIENTIST 54 (1985)).
157. Alison Davis, A Disabled Person’s Perspective on Pre-Natal Screening 9 (March 30,
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Leeds Centre for Disability
Studies),
available
at
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disabilitystudies/archiveuk/Davis/A%20Disabled%20Person.pdf.
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In light of circumstances like those of Ms. Davis’s, courts should
replace their bright-line “categories of disability and health as indicators of
harmful (or harmless) reproductive outcomes” with a non-dichotomous
approach that considers lived experiences.158 This approach should (1)
consider the burdens that accompany all parenting; (2) reinforce the
minority-group model of disability; and (3) emphasize that the “harm” of
disability varies greatly depending on biological, familial, financial,
attitudinal, and social factors. One judicial attempt to implement these
features is the special-damages model, which the following section
describes.
B. Courts Should Take Practical Steps to Implement a Contextual
Reproductive Tort Jurisprudence that Compensates Families and
Avoids False Dichotomies
To feasibly rid reproductive tort litigation of harmful dichotomies,
contextualize judicial decision-making, and adopt the minority-group
model, courts must not unrealistically weaken traditional tort processes.
The reproductive tort cases of the United States, Great Britain, and
elsewhere show “how far negligence law has come adrift of principle.”159
In fact, one scholar has called for “a much hoped for quiet u-turn with good
grace and no loss of face” in the jurisprudence of reproductive torts.160 But
because states are unlikely to flatly eliminate wrongful birth claims and
because a dramatic overhaul of the tort system is improbable, this Essay
recommends restrained, incremental steps.
To accommodate reproductive tort claimants while avoiding
stigmatizing dichotomies, courts should shift from blessing-harm
dichotomies to analyses based upon causation and “the needs of the
living.”161 A useful model for this approach is a 1984 decision from the
New Jersey Supreme Court that validated a wrongful life claim but
implemented a special damages scheme.162 In Procanik v. Cillo, an infant
sued for wrongful life, alleging that a doctor’s negligent failure to diagnose
his mother’s rubella in the first trimester of her pregnancy caused his birth,
which congenital rubella syndrome impaired.163 Avoiding health-disability
and blessing-harm dichotomies, the Procanik court adopted a “special

158. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 70.
159. See Laura C.H. Hoyano, Misconceptions about Wrongful Conception, 65 MOD. L. REV.
883, 892 (2002).
160. Priaulx, supra note 135, at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984) (deciding a reproductive tort case
“predicated on the needs of the living”).
162. Id. at 764.
163. Id. at 758.
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damages” approach to compensate the child for the “extraordinary medical
expenses attributable to his affliction.”164 Recognizing that certain social
factors were “beyond judicial competence” to evaluate,165 the court refused
to grant “general” damages for emotional distress or for an impaired
childhood.166 For five reasons, the court explained, this “special damages”
rule was superior to traditional approaches: (1) both parents and children
experience the burdens of costly medical care;167 (2) the special damages
approach recognizes that medical negligence “vitally affects the entire
family”;168 (3) courts can readily calculate special damages;169 (4)
restricting damage awards to “special” damages avoids the “philosophical”
problems posed by wrongful life claims;170 and (5) a child’s claim should
not depend on whether his parents are available to sue.171 Crucially, the
court’s decision “is not premised on the concept that non-life is preferable
to an impaired life, but is predicated on the needs of the living.”172
Procanik represents a vital shift in both premise and reasoning—a
departure from the blessing-harm dichotomy and movement toward a
contextual jurisprudence that accounts for the social, financial, and moral
concerns of families, people with disabilities, and communities. Emphasis
on the needs of the living, recognition that certain questions are not
judicable, application of a creative damages scheme, and attention to
context rather than “genetic disaster,” are practical steps courts can take to
revise their reproductive tort jurisprudence.
C. Although a Contextual, Non-Dichotomous Approach to
Reproductive Tort Jurisprudence May Undermine the Effectiveness
of Claimants’ Traditional Litigation Techniques, It Will Likely
Yield Net Benefits to All Interested Parties
Although a jurisprudence that frames a “vision of justice” in “needs
and realities” may avoid stereotypes,173 it also may weaken parents’
abilities to recover damages and may run counter to traditional adversarial

164. Id. at 757. The Supreme Court of California adopted a similar special damages approach
in Turpin v. Sortini to avoid some of the policy concerns of traditional wrongful life jurisprudence.
643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982) (in banc).
165. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 761.
166. Id. at 763.
167. Id. at 762.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 761.
170. Id. at 762–63.
171. Id. at 762 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Id. at 763. The Procanik court announced that it seeks “only to respond to the call of the
living for help in bearing the burden of their affliction.” Id.
173. See PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 157–58.
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processes. If a mother does not testify in open court that her newborn with
an unexpected genetic defect has caused “harm,” will a jury award high
damages? If a plaintiff’s lawyer does not aggressively distinguish a healthy
child from an impaired one, will the tort system adequately compensate the
client? If parents do not highlight the heavy burdens that arise from
children’s disabilities, can reproductive tort claims address the needs of the
living? Because tort practice is meant to summon the sympathy of jurors by
drawing clear distinctions, replacing a dichotomous approach with a
contextual one may correct social misperceptions at the expense of parents’
financial needs.
Professor Priaulx notes that although a contextual approach is
“essential if we are committed to embracing and responding to” families’
“diverse experiences of reproduction,” it is difficult to weaken dichotomies
without weakening the adversarial process.174
Although Procanik
promotes a shift in judicial focus toward the needs of the living, Professor
Priaulx doubts whether courts can construct a “linguistic framework of
need” that is as viable as the linguistic framework of harm.175 Unlike
“rights” and “harms,” which cause juries to assign responsibility, needs are
“not straightforwardly prescriptive.”176 Thus, while a contextual, needsbased approach may “sound less adversarial,”177 it also may prevent
plaintiffs from doing what is traditionally necessary to maximize damages:
drawing bright lines between blessings and harms; showing the high
financial costs of caring for ill children; and persuading the jury that your
family is suffering with an imperfect child. Indeed, “[t]he scientific ability
to draw fine distinctions among people based on genetic variation”178
parallels a plaintiff’s lawyer’s ability to draw fine distinctions that vividly
portray harm. Compared to the harm-based rhetoric on which reproductive
tort claimants traditionally rely to sway juries, this language of needs
“might . . . easily collapse.”179 So while a contextual, needs-based
approach might “carry less . . . baggage” than a dichotomous, harm-based
approach, a judicial shift that suppresses distinctions and trivializes harm
could diminish damage awards.180

174. Id.
175. Id. Professor Priaulx asks, “How might our claim look? A right or responsibility to have
one’s need fulfilled? Or a need to have one’s needs recognised [sic]?” Id. at 157. Professor
Priaulx argues that although the needs-framework is “initially compelling,” it does not “stand up
to closer scrutiny.” Id.
176. Jeremy Waldron, The Role of Rights in Practical Reasoning: “Rights” versus “Needs,” 4
J. ETHICS 115, 121 (2000).
177. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 158.
178. Rothstein, supra note 128, at 435.
179. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 158.
180. Id.
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Although a contextual approach may weaken claimants’
persuasiveness and lessen monetary awards, it may have substantial net
benefits. Given the diversity of sensitive interests at stake—families’
financial needs, the social equality of the disability community, judicial
administrability, etc.—courts must holistically evaluate the positive effects
of a contextual approach. Under a special damages approach, for instance,
wrongful birth claimants can leave the courtroom without the shame of
having disparaged their newborns in open court. Lawmakers and
community-members can witness or read about reproductive tort cases
without receiving judicial messages that people with disabilities are less
valuable.
Insurance companies, local and national policymakers,
employers, and service-providers may follow judges’ leads and begin to
better accommodate the disability community. Thus, while a nondichotomous jurisprudence may slightly diminish damage awards, it may
grant significant net benefits to all interested parties.
IV. BECAUSE LEGAL AUTONOMY IN REPRODUCTIVE DECISION-MAKING
DOES NOT NECESSARILY YIELD ACTUAL PARENTAL REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM, COURTS MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE SOCIAL
CONSTRAINTS ON PARENTAL CHOICE
The search for a reproductive tort jurisprudence that protects both the
disability community and the tort system raises important questions about
parental autonomy. Is the gap between legal reproductive autonomy and
actual reproductive freedom growing? Are reproductive choices really free
choices when society legalizes prenatal options but, de facto, embraces only
one option? In addition to contextualizing their notions of harm and
disability, judges should also contextualize their understanding of parental
choice, especially in a social climate that practically limits that choice.
Simultaneously, new medical technology expands and constrains
parental reproductive choices. On the one hand, contraceptive devices let
women plan their pregnancies; genetic testing helps couples decide whether
to abort their fetuses; alternative methods of managing labor and delivery
give women a say in the birthing process; and in vitro fertilization, embryo
transfer, and artificial insemination allow couples to “circumvent their
infertility.”181 On the other hand, the effects of reproductive technologies
are not understandable “in a vacuum.”182 Reproductive choice does not
181. Aila Collins & Judith Rodin, The New Reproductive Technologies: What Have We
Learned?, in WOMEN & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: MEDICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL,
LEGAL, AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS 153, 153–54 (Judith Rodin & Aila Collins eds., 1991).
182. Barbara K. Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Then and Now, in WOMEN & PRENATAL
TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 260, 264 (Karen H. Rothenberg
& Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994).
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entail freedom of choice if new technologies, “subterranean political
ideologies,” and “hidden arguments” beneath the “surface language of
neutrality”183 in the medical, social, and legal communities heavily
influence decision-making. Despite these “constraints on the choice” to use
or not use prenatal testing, to have or not have an abortion in an “at risk”
pregnancy,184 and to sue or not sue for wrongful birth or wrongful life,
judicial decisions tend to rely heavily on parents’ reproductive decisions.185
A. The Social Origins of the Reasonable Person Standard, Sameness
Model of Equality, and Increasingly Patriarchal Perception of
Pregnancy Constrain Parents’ Reproductive Choices
Parents must make reproductive decisions in the context of three
categories of social constraint. First, reproductive decisions are “social
decisions”186 and judicial standards arise from those social standards.
Specifically, the reasonably prudent person test—a “flexible, easily
understandable”187 standard meant to compensate reproductive tort victims,
fairly allocate costs, and deter misconduct188—has substantial
undercurrents of social context.189 Professor Rothstein notes that this
standard “reflects a pre-industrial, agrarian view that all men had a basic
skill set,” including the abilities to build homes, tend to animals, and
respond to physical threats.190 Thus, the reasonably prudent person is the
“personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior,”191 which is
likely why the Curlender court noted that tort law reflects the “basic
changes in the way society views [reproductive tort] matters.”192 Because
the reasonably prudent person standard seeks to approximate a singular
behavioral ideal, courts use contextual, “individualized” standards
infrequently—“only when the differences are obvious.”193 And since
“[e]quality of opportunity” was not “part of the doctrinal development” of

183. TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 113, 129 (1990); see also infra Part IV.A.
184. Rothman, supra note 182, at 260.
185. See infra Part IV.B.
186. Rothman, supra note 182, at 267. In fact, Professor Rothman says that these decisions are
“never ‘medical’ decisions.” Id.
187. Rothstein, supra note 128, at 437.
188. Id. at 438.
189. See id. at 438–39. This standard, originally called the “reasonable man” standard, came
about in nineteenth-century England. Id. at 437.
190. Id. at 438. Professor Rothstein notes that, as a result of these views, courts assumed there
was “a narrow range of social variability among individuals,” an assumption that is “no longer
true.” Id.
191. Id. at 437.
192. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
193. Rothstein, supra note 128, at 439.
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tort law,194 courts often disregard it. Thus, both parental and judicial
choices in reproductive tort claims are always strained through the sieve of
a legal system that social factors heavily influence.
Second, contextualized notions of equality affect the reproductive
choices of parents, courts, and communities. Professor Rothstein has
recently assessed how the legal conception of equality might require change
“as scientists perfect the ability to identify individual variations at the
genetic level.”195 Currently, the law restricting genetic discrimination and
the law restricting other discrimination are based upon opposing principles
of equality. While the ADA is based upon a “‘difference’ model which
requires an individualized determination of fitness,”196 genetic
nondiscrimination statutes are based on the “civil rights model of
‘sameness.’”197 This sameness model, some feminist scholars argue, uses
the “lens of the dominant group”198 and thus treats social minorities “as if”
they were the majority.199 Consequently, parents and courts must decide
life-changing reproductive matters in the context of a sameness legal model
that belies the reality of genetic diversity.200 Recognizing this concern, one
scholar advocates “replacing” the sameness model with one that respects
“individual differences.”201
Third, changing views of pregnancy may affect parental, judicial, and
societal decisions regarding people with disabilities. Expressly, Professor
Rothman points out, genetic technology “reconstructs pregnancy in men’s
image.”202 Professor Rothman explains that while pregnancy is a process
of separation for women,203 it is a process of delivery for men.204 In two
main ways, genetic technology advances this patriarchal, “outside” view of

194. Id. at 438. Professor Rothstein points out that tort law “does not consider minor
variations” in peoples’ character and capabilities. Id. at 437. Age, disability, “special talents,”
and “training” are some of the few “exceptions” that give rise to an individualized standard
because, in those cases, the differences are overt. Id.
195. Id. at 455.
196. Id. at 447.
197. See id. at 456 (noting that this “sameness” model is inappropriate for genetic diversity).
198. Id. at 457 (citing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 56 (1990)). Professor Rothstein notes that in the United States,
this dominant group is “white males.” Id.
199. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. See id. at 456 (“The civil rights model of ‘sameness’ and the fiction that ‘all difference is
irrelevant’ are inappropriate legal models for genetic diversity.”). Professor Rothstein adds that
justifications for the sameness model are rapidly fading. Id. at 458.
201. Id. at 462.
202. Rothman, supra note 182, at 262. Professor Rothman asserts that “[g]enetic technology
changes the very way in which we think about pregnancy.” Id.
203. Id. at 262–63. Professor Rothman states that pregnancy is the process by which “part of
[the woman] goes on to become someone else.” Id. at 263.
204. Id. at 263.
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pregnancy: (1) “[c]onceptually, the fetus becomes a potential patient to be
tested”; and (2) “physically, a preimplantation diagnosis manipulates the
material that will become the baby in a procedure conducted outside of the
woman’s body.”205 According to Professor Rothman, the effects of this
patriarchal pregnancy model on women’s reproductive choices “are now
coming to haunt us.”206 In particular, genetic technology advances the
notion that pregnancy is a “contractual agreement” between a woman and
the “controllers” of the prenatal genetic material.207 As society comes to
view women as “site[s] for [fetal] implantation,” women are increasingly
“subjected to social control” by those with expanded access to and interest
in prenatal genetic material.208
B. Judicial Decisions Give Heavy Weight to Parental Reproductive
Decisions Even Though Social Factors Substantially Restrain
Parental Freedom of Choice
In light of the social, political, and legal contexts of parental
reproductive decision-making, Professor Rothman finds the “language of
individual choice untenable.”209 Although genetic technology lets women
“choose” whether to birth a child with a disability, women “are not given
choices about the environment in which that child would live.”210 When a
woman chooses to abort her fetus that has a genetic defect, she does so “in a
world that sets the parameters of that child’s life just as surely as genes
do.”211 Other scholars agree that new genetic technologies “may serve to
reduce choice” because (1) these technologies carry unanticipated
emotional costs; (2) “the availability of prenatal testing” pressures women
to “submit to screening”; and (3) the possibility of genetic abnormality
“casts its shadow” over the early months of pregnancy.212
These facets of parental choice directly affect judicial decision-making
in reproductive tort cases. In wrongful conception and wrongful birth
205. Id. As a result, the “technology we have developed and continue to develop reifies a male
notion of pregnancy, of the making of babies.” Id.
206. Id. at 263–64.
207. Id. at 264. These “controllers” may be the father, the government, the laboratory, or the
potential adopters. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 267.
210. Id.
211. Id. Notably, Professor Rothman states that abortion “can be the right choice, the moral
choice, the only choice, but it, like birthing the child, is always a choice in a context.” Id.
(emphasis added).
212. Collins & Rodin, supra note 181, at 154–55. Professor Rothman has labeled the latter
phenomenon the “tentative pregnancy.” Id. at 154. Some scholars question these views, noting
the distinction between a difficult choice and no choice at all. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 153–54
(citation omitted).
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cases, for instance, courts typically “scrutini[ze]” the claimants’ decisions
and hold the claimants partly responsible for reproductive risks,213 even if
social pressures heavily influenced those decisions. Whether through
“formal notions of causation, mitigation or not,” Professor Priaulx argues,
courts regard parental conduct as the “prime mover” in generating
damages.214 Professor Priaulx observes that “both abortion and adoption
continue to be used as sociolegal tools” in judicial decision-making because
courts fail to fully account for social pressures on reproductive choice.215
Potentially, a shift in the legal and societal conceptions of tort, equality, and
pregnancy would allow women’s legal choices to better approximate their
freedom of choice and would give courts a more sound conceptual context
in which to decide cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Judges adjudicating wrongful birth and wrongful life claims must act
deliberately to ensure that the persistent current of stigmatizing stereotypes
about people with disabilities does not infiltrate their judicial opinions.216
In adopting a more contextual approach, courts must carefully consider the
substantial hardships that families of children with disabilities endure while
resisting inaccurate notions of harm, disability, and autonomy.217 Because
judicial opinions influence societal views of the disability community and
because the impact of negligent prenatal genetic testing is equally harmful,
courts must always consider the variety of sensitive interests at stake.218
Generally, the few scholars that have addressed these intricate concerns
advocate “steps to help build social supports and attitudes that make it
possible for a woman to go through a pregnancy even when the
amniocentesis shows that the baby may carry a defect.”219 But until
communities achieve this progress, courts that carefully account for the
many social contexts in which genetic choices and reproductive disputes
arise have an improved capacity to make sensitive and accurate
decisions.220

213. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 108. This often occurs through the mitigation doctrine. Id.
214. Id. Professor Priaulx notes that courts emphasize that “claimants could have chosen
otherwise.” Id.
215. Id. at 109. Professor Priaulx asserts that “neither abortion nor adoption constitute
choices” in our current political, legal, and social climate. Id. at 137.
216. See supra Part II.
217. See supra Part III.
218. See supra Part III.
219. Collins & Rodin, supra note 181, at 156.
220. See supra Part IV.

